FOREIGN AGRICULTURE

May 1962

Evening meal, Korea

Secretary Freeman on Food for Peace

Africa Firsthand vs. Secondhand

Soviet Farm Shortages

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE · FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE

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FOREIGN AGRICULTURE

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Source of Strength

One hundred years ago, on May 15, 1862, the United States' Department of Agriculture was created by the stroke of President Lincoln's pen. The century that has passed since then has been marked by the great growth of this country, unique in world history. In this growth agriculture has been a basic source of strength.

The products of U.S. farms bought and paid for the primary economic development of our country. Tobacco, cotton, and grains moved across the Atlantic by the millions of tons to purchase the steel, the tools, and the machines which brought the industrial revolution to our land. This early exchange set in motion technological advances that carried us along the road to prosperity.

Today American farms not only produce enough to make us the best fed and best clothed people in the world but they have enough left over so that we can share our abundance with millions of people overseas.

Most of our export sharing is done through the commercial market but a substantial amount takes place also through the special export program known as Food for Peace. Our lead article this month by Secretary Freeman describes this Food for Peace sharing.

The Secretary tells of the U.S. foodstuffs going abroad to be used in school lunch programs and to be distributed by philanthropic groups when famine, flood, and other disasters hit. He tells how the newly developing countries that purchase our foods with their own currencies are given access to funds generated through these sales to further their own economic progress.

And thus the circle completes itself. Our agriculture, which helped to make this country the richest in the world, is now helping the underdeveloped countries up the same path.

Cover Photograph

A Korean family enjoys its evening meal of noodles made from U.S. wheat. Under the Food for Peace Program, U.S. farm products are supplementing the food resources of over 100 countries. (See article on pages 3-6.)

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Food for Peace
—promise and problems

By ORVILLE L. FREEMAN
Secretary of Agriculture

"Why—if we have more food than we can use in the United States—don't we send it to hungry populations overseas?"

That question has been put to me dozens of times in the past year. It is a revealing question. It shows that our people are sincerely interested in seeing the productivity of U.S. farms used effectively. It proves—if proof is needed—that our citizens, as always, are eager to help the less fortunate.

I share the wishes of these earnest Americans. To me, it is a moral imperative that we make maximum effective use of our God-given abundance. In a very real sense there is no surplus as long as food can be sent to those who do not have enough to eat.

At the same time, the question also shows surprising unawareness of what the Food for Peace Program already is doing to combat hunger—of obstacles to any sharp expansion of the program—and of the nature of America's surplus problem. Food for Peace has done tremendous good for others, and for us. It can be made even more effective, I am sure. But Food for Peace—though part of the answer to the twin problems of surpluses here and hunger abroad—is not the complete answer.

U.S. farm products already are supplementing the food resources of over 100 countries having a combined population of over 1.3 billion. Included are countries with large populations—India, Pakistan, Brazil, Korea, Egypt, Poland. But U.S. food also goes to small places, such as Grenada, Mauritius, and Montserrat. No one country has a monopoly on hunger.

In the 7 fiscal years, 1955-61, our Food for Peace shipments had an export value of over $9.5 billion. That was a third of total U.S. agricultural exports valued at $28.5 billion.

How Program Works

What is called the Food for Peace

Above, Secretary Freeman on a recent visit to India was warmly greeted by the village of Surehra. Top, at Bombay harbor workers pack U.S. wheat into bags. Wheat was shipped under P.L. 480 to supplement India's supply

Filipino children hold empty tins and bags as they wait to get U.S. powdered milk being distributed to the needy.

Thirteen-year-old Julio Junga fills the cups of other students at the morning milk break at a Bogotá school.

Program includes, primarily, activities authorized by Public Law 480. Under P.L. 480, U.S. food is being sold for rupees, cruzeiros, pesos, and other foreign currencies when countries needing assistance lack dollars with which to buy. Food is being bartered for strategic and other materials. It is moving directly through grants to foreign governments to meet emergency needs, or via donations to U.S. voluntary agencies, such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Lutheran World Relief, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and other groups carrying on foreign assistance programs. It is being sold for dollars on long-term credit to underdeveloped countries.

Over 28 million children in 83 countries are taking part in school feeding programs based largely on U.S. food. It is being moved rapidly—by U.S. voluntary agencies and foreign governments—when famine, flood, and other disasters hit. It is being used for refugee feedings and child-care programs. It is being used in Tunisia, Afghanistan, and several other countries as partial payment of wages on public works projects.

Food for Peace is accounting for an increasingly larger percentage of the total U.S. economic assistance program. Of the $4.5 billion extended to all foreign countries in fiscal year 1961, $1.5 billion—a third—represents economic aid growing out of this program. Foreign currencies generated under the program have been used for irrigation, reclamation, and reforestation projects; for improvement of railroads, highways, and bridges; for construction of electric power generating facilities; for building new hospitals, clinics, and schools. Food not only underwrites employment and development but counters the price inflation that generally accompanies development projects.

Our Benefits

Those are some of the things foreign peoples are getting out of the Food for Peace Program. But we are getting some benefits, too. And let's not be apologetic about our benefits.

First of all, in helping underdeveloped countries, we are bolstering U.S. foreign policy in numerous ways. We are doing that by strengthening the will and the capacity of Free World peoples to stay free. We are creating a friendly "image" of the United States in foreign countries—an image of a kindly people who want to help others just because, as President Kennedy has said, "It is right." We are showing predominantly agricultural countries that farmers living under a free democratic system, such as we have in the United States, can outproduce the collectivized farm workers of the Soviet Union by a ratio of 5 to 1.

U.S. food, in stepping up economic growth, is creating a climate that eventually could mean increased cash sales. This is not a remote possibility. At the end of World War II, Italy and Japan were prostrate, economically. Massive U.S. aid put them back on their feet. Today, both countries are big markets for U.S. products. Japan, in fact, is the biggest buyer of U.S. agricultural products.

The Food for Peace Program is adding to U.S. farmers' incomes. It is tending to stabilize our farm product prices by reducing supply pressure on markets. It is reducing storage costs. It is stimulating business for railroads, seaports, and shipping lines.

Why Not All

Because Food for Peace obviously is a good program for the underdeveloped countries and for us, lots of people reason, "If a $9½ billion program is good, a $19 billion operation should be twice as good." Eventually, they get around to asking the question I mentioned earlier "Why don't we use *all* of our agricultural surpluses for overseas relief?"

Here are some of the reasons we can't do that:

Many underdeveloped countries lack the transportation, storage, and distribution facilities needed to reach hungry people with imported foods. Furthermore, in the underdeveloped

countries there are few organizations, such as civic clubs and church groups, available to handle large-scale distribution of food. It has been said that in some of the underdeveloped countries it is easier to sell food than to give it away—because there is a commercial distribution system, whereas noncommercial channels to the people do not exist.

Traditional eating habits keep many people from making wide use of the foods the United States has in greatest abundance. A nation accustomed to eating rice does not readily turn to corn or even to wheat.

Commercial trade of the United States and of nations friendly to us must be safeguarded, and that places certain limitations on us. If a country can afford to buy some of its food, it should do so. The proper role of the Food for Peace Program is furnishing supplies that are in addition to, not a replacement of, what otherwise would move through normal trade channels. Burma and Thailand, for example, produce and export large quantities of rice. They are very watchful—and properly so—that donated supplies from the United States do not replace their normal markets in the Far East.

Finally, there is the fact that agriculture is the leading occupation of the people in India, Pakistan, Spain, Brazil, Turkey, and all the other underdeveloped countries receiving Food for Peace shipments. Prices received by farmers in these countries are affected by U.S. imports. If the imported supplies unduly disturb the native agricultural economies, farmers let their governments hear about it. This political pressure, even in countries where people generally don't have enough to eat, is one of the "valves" regulating the volume of food that will be allowed to come in from the United States.

We have seen a recent example of these forces at work. In 1960, the United States agreed to sell India over a 4-year period 587 million bushels of wheat and 22 million bags of rice, payment to be made in rupees under Public Law 480. It was the biggest single international food deal in the world's history. In 1961, however, India harvested a record crop of food grains. India, of course, wanted Indian grain to move into consumption first, and to have priority on the transportation and storage facilities. That's what happened. The reduced need for U.S. imports is reflected in statistics on India's P.L. 480 purchases. Food imports from the United States dropped from an export value of $303 million in 1960 to $134 million in 1961.

Funds from the sale of U.S. surplus foods help pay for public works projects in developing countries. Here Tunisians extract stone to be used in road construction.

Tunisian stone diggers line up to be paid. Workers receive part of their salary in money, part in semolina made from U.S. wheat, donated to the program.

What They Want

The lesson to be learned from all this is clear. The United States could not successfully carry on any program aimed at feeding the world. Rather, we must—while using food for emergency needs and for short-term programs of economic development—concentrate our efforts on helping the people of the developing nations help themselves. That's the kind of help they want—and, as far as agriculture is concerned, the principal kind of help they will let us give them.

We have a vast reservoir of agricultural know-how. We have been sharing it with the world. Today about 1,200 U.S. agricultural technicians are assisting and training technicians in over 50 countries. The U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. agricultural colleges have been cooperating in this work. Hundreds of foreign agriculturalists are coming to the United States to see how we do it in the laboratory, on the test plot, and in actual practice at the farm. All

this work could be greatly expanded. We have nothing to lose and everything to gain by passing on to others our skills. As the old Scandinavian proverb has it, "Another can light his candle from yours without loss to you."

But our technology, here in the United States, is giving us what has been called a "crisis of abundance." Food for Peace, as I have indicated, is not the complete answer to this problem.

Agricultural surpluses in this country trace primarily to our enormous productive capacity. Fewer people are on farms today, and fewer people are engaged in agriculture than at any time since the Civil War. Yet they produce an overabundance of food and fiber for a national population of 185 million, plus the biggest farm exports in history.

Race With Surpluses

Given every practical way we know for using our food abundance effectively, we will for the foreseeable future be able to produce at a faster rate than this food can be put to effective use. Every knowledgeable person with whom I have discussed this challenge—prominent agricultural economists, farm leaders, businessmen, and members of both political parties in Congress—agrees that for some time ahead, 10 years at a minimum, our ability to produce will grow faster than our capacity to consume. We will fall behind in the race with surpluses; that is, unless we adopt a coordinated farm program.

The program of "managed abundance" recommended to the Congress by President Kennedy is such a program. Managed abundance, also called the ABCD program, has four distinct but related goals. These are *abundance*—to expand food consumption, both domestic and foreign; *balance*—to adjust the production of commodities now in serious oversupply; *conservation*—to achieve wiser land use at a time when millions of acres are being unalterably committed to one use or another; and *development*—to upgrade economic opportunity for rural people.

We obviously need to balance supply with domestic and export requirements. Failure to do this has drawn prime national resources into the production and storage of surplus commodities. We should welcome, not fear, production management. Among all the nations of the world, we have the opportunity to manage, on a mammoth scale, abundance rather than scarcity.

We want to see that all of our wants and needs here in the United States are met. At the same time we are using all of our creative imagination and know-how to develop effective overseas outlets. The President's farm program envisages expansion of Food for Peace in overseas school lunch programs. He has recommended changes in legislation which would permit shipment of surpluses not in government inventory, broadening of long-term credit authority, and use of U.S. food in multinational programs. Every effort is being made by the Department of Agriculture, the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the Office of the Director, Food for Peace, to integrate the use of surplus food into every country aid plan.

It could be said, in summary, that two major adjustments must be made if the unbalanced food situation facing us and the deficit countries is to be corrected: The United States must adjust its agricultural production levels downward. The underdeveloped countries of the world, with technological assistance from us and others, must boost their agricultural output. The Food for Peace Program can help fill gaps while this adjustment is taking place.

The Food for Peace Program is a good program. It will be with us for a long time. It will increase in effectiveness. In itself it cannot solve the farm problem but it can contribute materially to meeting human needs, and promoting the development of emerging nations, in the interests of a better world for us and our children.



Left, Indian technicians learn to repair power lines and, below, moving gravel for a new hydroelectric plant. P.L. 480 loans help India finance both projects.

Farm Trade of Australia and New Zealand
—and how British membership in EEC may affect it

By MARY E. LONG
Regional Analysis Division
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Australia and New Zealand probably have as great a stake in the Common Market's agricultural policies as any British Commonwealth areas.

Both countries rely heavily on agricultural exports for foreign exchange. Both have largely based their trade on exports to the United Kingdom, markets on the Continent being a more recent development. And both are producers of Temperate Zone products, and thus particularly vulnerable to the keen competition likely to be created in the U.K. and EEC markets for these items.

The formal U.K. application for membership in the EEC intensified the concern already felt by Australia and New Zealand about the effects of Common Market policies on their agricultural trade. Recognizing that this would happen, U.K. officials had emphasized in requesting membership that no agreement would be achieved unless satisfactory arrangements could be negotiated to meet the special needs of U.K. agriculture, the Commonwealth, and the European Free Trade Association.

General Effect

Together, the United Kingdom and the present six Common Market nations import about 53 percent of the agricultural commodities entering world trade. About half of these imports are foods and animal feedstuffs. This market outlet is, and will continue to be, especially attractive to nations like Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, Argentina, and the Republic of South Africa—all producers of agricultural surpluses. More than three-fourths of New Zealand's agricultural exports and half of Australia's, by value, go to the United Kingdom and the six EEC nations.

New Zealand's economy is especially sensitive to changes in trade patterns affecting agricultural products. Over 90 percent of its foreign exchange revenue comes from exports of three commodities—dairy products, meat, and wool. Because New Zealand emphasizes the production of livestock and livestock products, and because it depends heavily on the United Kingdom as a market, it is expected to feel greater repercussions from U.K. membership in the EEC than Australia. It faces the difficult task of trying to diversify its economy and expand its limited export possibilities within the time limits set for the full implementation of EEC policies.

Australia, on the other hand, produces a wider variety of agricultural commodities for export. Also, a larger share of its revenue from agricultural exports is provided by wool, which is relatively unaffected by EEC competition. In addition, Australia has greater mineral resources and more raw materials for industry and can attract investment capital. Thus, during the next 5 years it could stress processing and other types of manufacturing and achieve a more diversified export trade.

The tentative external trade policy for the EEC makes provision for certain raw-material products to enter the Common Market free of duty. Among the agricultural commodities so admitted, two are of primary importance to Australia and New Zealand: wool and raw hides and skins. Australian exports of these to the United Kingdom and the EEC area averaged $484 million annually in 1957-59, or about 59 percent of the total value of its agricultural exports to these markets. In the same period, New Zealand's shipments of these products to the United Kingdom and the Common Market represented about 33 percent of the total value of its agricultural shipments there. The two countries' exports of wool and hides and skins to the EEC area could expand if enlargement of Europe's industrial capacity brings increased demand for these items.

All other major agricultural exports originating from Australia and New Zealand and destined for the Common Market will be subject to either external tariffs, import levies, or other EEC limitations on suppliers.

Commodity Problems

Both countries have traditional markets for *dairy products* in the United Kingdom, and currently their butter and cheese enter the U.K. market under the preferential "free" rate. Their dairy products would be subject to the EEC external tariff—butter would be dutiable at 24 percent ad valorem and cheese at 23 percent. They would face stiffer price competition from Dutch and Danish butter and from French and Italian cheese. For Australia and New Zealand, long distances from the European market mean higher costs for refrigeration and handling. These, added to the duties, could make marketing in Europe difficult even for a producer as efficient as New Zealand. Also, the guaranteed marketing assurance for dairy products granted to New Zealand in the 1959 U.K.-New Zealand trade agreement would probably be voided.

Since 1958, Australia and New Zealand together have supplied about 27 percent of all *meat* exports entering into world trade, and in 1960 New Zealand became the world's largest meat exporter. Both countries are primarily shippers of frozen and chilled beef, veal, lamb, and mutton. Australia's total meat shipments in 1959-60 were valued at $190 million, of which approximately 43 percent went to the United Kingdom and EEC countries. New Zealand's total in the same period was $227 million, and about 66 percent went to the U.K.-EEC market.

Under EEC trade policies, both Australia's and New Zealand's meats could face greater price competition from U.K. and continental producers. Most of these meats now enter the U.K. market at "free" rates; serious marketing difficulties would arise from the proposed EEC import tariffs, ranging from 12 percent ad valorem on lamb and mutton offal to 20 per-

cent on chilled and frozen beef, veal, lamb, and mutton. This could be particularly hard for New Zealand, which sends 90 percent of its lamb and mutton exports to the United Kingdom.

Australia's and New Zealand's meat trade could be affected by the loss of marketing guarantees granted them in the United Kingdom. These commitments, effective until 1967, would be subject to the bilateral-agreement provisions of the Common Market treaty and could be nullified in 1963, or at such time as EEC policies are implemented. Both Australia and New Zealand also have small quota sales of beef, lamb, and mutton to Western Germany under trade agreements with that country. This trade will either cease or be subject to the higher import duties and quantitative restrictions provided for in the new Common Market agricultural policy.

In recent years, about 65 percent (by value) of Australia's *fresh fruit* exports and 90 percent of New Zealand's—chiefly apples and pears—have been destined for the U.K. and EEC markets. At present, the shipments to the United Kingdom are exempt from duty under the preferential system; but with the United Kingdom in the Common Market, they would be subject to the common external tariff and the EEC quality standards applicable for fresh apples and pears as of July 1, 1962. The bulk of this fruit would probably arrive in the U.K. and continental markets during April to July when the ad valorem duty rates prevailing would be 8 percent ad valorem or a minimum of $1.40 per 100 kilograms for apples and 10 percent or a minimum of $1.50 per 100 kilograms for pears.

Despite the fact that the production seasons for the Southern Hemisphere are the opposite of those for the Northern Hemisphere, Australian and New Zealand growers could still face considerable competition from French, Italian, and U.S. supplies. Cold storage facilities are now so perfected that the marketing of fruits is extended over longer periods; this sometimes causes the overlapping of suppliers.

Separate Australian Worries

Other problems exist for Australia alone. A combined *wheat and flour* quota established in the Australian-U.K. bilateral trade agreement of 1957 could be abrogated in 1963 in accordance with the Common Market bilateral-agreement policy. Several continental European countries are already either self-sufficient in soft wheat—the type most competitive with Australia's—or surplus producers. Given the proper production incentives, these suppliers—particularly France—could develop greater competition for Australia in both the U.K. and continental European markets. Such a situation could result from the 20 and 30 percent ad valorem tariff rates proposed for Common Market imports of wheat and flour respectively, or from producer price stabilization measures.

In addition, when Australia's preferential marketing advantage for wheat and wheat flour in the U.K. market is eliminated, its exports may encounter greater competition from the United States, Canada, and Argentina.

Australian *dried fruit* now enters the U.K. market free of duty. With the United Kingdom as an EEC member, such imports would be subject to the tariffs established by the EEC for currants and raisins and to increased competition from both Mediterranean and U.S. products. Greece, already an associate member of EEC, and Turkey, which may join, could enjoy special tariff benefits in the U.K. market.

As an exporter of *raw sugar* to the United Kingdom, Australia could lose the preferential tariff and trading privileges it now has under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. The present agreement, effective until 1968, would either be abrogated or modified to the extent of U.K. negotiations with the EEC. Australia will be faced with a high protective tariff for sugar, perhaps one close to 80 percent ad valorem, such as is currently proposed for imports of sugar from outside the Common Market. Additional EEC price policies protective of domestic sugar beet producers may also work to Australia's disadvantage.

Wine, one of Australia's newer exports, might also encounter serious marketing difficulties in the United Kingdom. About 85 percent of Australia's wine exports are now consigned to this protected market; under the Common Market arrangement, French, German, and Italian wines would benefit.

Efforts at Adjustment

Both Australia and New Zealand are trying to cushion their economies against trade changes that U.K. membership in the EEC might cause.

Australia has actively promoted exports, both in established and in new marketing areas. It has increased its expenditures on fairs, trade missions, and trade studies; established new trade offices; and concentrated on market expansion in areas of large population with long-term potential for development and increased buying power. Australia has successfully expanded its markets for wheat and flour, particularly in Asia, and this effort will be aided by the establishment of a new shipping service between Western Australia and ports in Sarawak, Thailand, and North Borneo.

New Zealand has also engaged in trade promotion; but, unfortunately, lack of funds has not permitted it to develop new markets in proportion to its needs. Some success has attended dairy promotion in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, but New Zealand's latest and most promising promotion achievement is a dramatic increase in shipments of lamb and mutton to Japan.

Within the last 2 years, New Zealand has been exploring the possibility of building up such industries as textiles, wood pulp and paper, aluminum processing, and fisheries. Expansion there could alleviate some of the strain now placed on agricultural production and farm export earnings to sustain the economy. Although some progress has been made, the process is slow because of the lack of natural resources and the shortage of capital for investment. The recent discovery of natural gas and petroleum deposits in western North Island may speed industrial development, but time and capital investment will be needed to develop these resources.

In all probability the United Kingdom will have to press for special concessions for New Zealand on dairy products and meats until New Zealand can develop new marketing outlets or establish a more diversified economy.

Left, in Senegal the author stops to inspect mangoes while the vendor solemnly poses for his picture. Below, women bring produce to trainside as it passes through the Ivory Coast.

Africa Firsthand vs. Secondhand

Last year, one of our agricultural economists, Snider W. Skinner, spent two months in West Africa observing its agriculture. From this trip, he concluded that neither on-the-spot observation nor desk-bound research is enough—it takes both.

For 4 years I worked on Africa at my desk in Washington without ever setting foot on African soil. During that time I wrote and published a 40-page bulletin on Ghana's agriculture and trade in farm products and a 56-page booklet on the agricultural economy of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. I also wrote articles on South-West Africa, Cameroun, Togo, Sierra Leone, Chad, Mauritania, and the short-lived Federation of Mali.

How does one learn enough at a desk to write an article about a country several thousand miles away—especially if that country is part of the rapidly changing continent of Africa?

You tap every source you can lay your hands on. Mine were numerous —reports from U.S. agricultural attachés overseas, State Department dispatches, ICA (now AID) reports, official statements of foreign governments, publications from foreign commercial banks, encyclopedias, geographies, and, of course, newspapers and magazines.

There is one trouble about writing from secondary sources. You lack confidence and you suspect that your readers will feel the same. My Congo bulletin was published in July 1960, just as that newly independent country's troubles began in earnest. A colleague sent a copy to a Washington newspaperman, who was so interested that he telephoned to ask if he could see me. When he found that I had never been in the Congo, his interest cooled. His column the next day was about an animal character in a child's book.

So, as I planned my 67-day official trip to Europe and Africa last year, I had high hopes of being able to add a certain amount of conviction and authority to my writing.

Cameroons, First Stop

On April 19, I landed at Tiko, British Southern Cameroons, and now a part of the new Federal Republic of Cameroun. This was the first time I had ever seen tropical agriculture, and my impressions were most revealing.

One of my visits was to the Tole Tea Estate, high up on the side of Mt. Cameroon, and here I was exposed to my first "booby trap." There were tea plants everywhere, so that my mind still clings to the idea that tea is an important crop in the Cameroons. Yet the Tole tea plantation is the only one in West Africa and its 1958 production of 25,583 pounds was only one-thousandth of 1 percent of the world's tea production.

Seeing bananas being planted, sprayed, and cut for harvest gave me a better balanced picture of their position—a major one—in the economy of the Southern Cameroons. To see cocoa growing we had to go through an African village to a small cocoa grove, and I think I got about the right emphasis on that, too. However, if I had depended solely on personal observations, I would not have known that coffee is a big crop in the Southern Cameroons for it is grown north of the Tiko-Buea area which I visited.

Nigeria

Later the same week, I was traveling north through Eastern Nigeria in company with Dick Hale, the political





N'Dama cattle at a research station in Bouaké, Ivory Coast. Though seemingly well fed, they produce practically no milk.

New flour mill under construction at Abidjan, Ivory Coast. The wheat used will come from the franc area.

officer in the American Embassy at Lagos. In the 8 days on the road, we got a rather clear, comprehensive view of agriculture in each of the three regions of Nigeria.

If I had written a summary of agriculture in Eastern Nigeria solely from personal observations, it would have been essentially accurate. We saw semiwild oil palms, tall showy trees, everywhere. We saw the big bunches of palm fruit being cut from the tops of the trees and hauled away to the "pioneer" oil mills, where we watched the actual production of palm oil and the cracking of palm kernels. And we also saw yams (not our sweetpotatoes) at various stages of growth —being planted, coming up, and with vines full-grown on poles.

All of this verified what I had learned from secondary sources—that oil palm products constitute the major agricultural export of Eastern Nigeria and that yams are a leading domestic food crop.

In Northern Nigeria, however, personal observations alone would have been much less reliable. I knew that peanuts and cotton are the region's major exports. Both crops are grown by African farmers, almost entirely with hand labor. Yet when we were there, the peanut and cotton harvests were over and the planting seasons had not started, so we did not see a single stalk of cotton and only came across a few stray peanut plants. Fortunately, the agricultural scientists, at the regional research station of the Ministry of Agriculture at Samaru, near Zaria, gave me much valuable information on these and other crops not growing at the time.

To keep up with our schedule, we drove in 1 day the 410 miles from Kontagora, Northern Nigeria, to Lagos, and consequently had only fleeting glimpses of cocoa trees and kola nut trees, though we drove through the heaviest cocoa- and kola nut-producing areas of Western Nigeria. The cocoa bush or tree is so inconspicuous and shade-loving that had I not known they were there I would have missed them entirely.

Ghana—Ivory Coast

Later, during an 8-day visit to Ghana, I got the proper perspective on cocoa. Cocoa is Ghana's largest export crop and the country is the world's largest cocoa exporter. In Ghana, I saw cocoa being loaded on to ships at Tema Harbor and the beans being manufactured into cocoa products in a modern plant in Takoradi. Also, I spent a weekend at the West African Cocoa Research Institute at Tafo. There I did see cocoa growing—but under research station conditions which are often quite different from those of the country's cocoa farms.

It was in the Ivory Coast that I found my personal observation to be the most valuable. I had never written about the Ivory Coast and had much to learn. In the company of Jim Gehr, our agricultural attaché for the area, I spent 17 days traveling through this young republic and saw practically every agricultural commodity of importance, some in various stages of growth and processing.

Coffee, the Ivory Coast's leading export crop, earned 50 percent of the country's export income in 1960. Cocoa, the second biggest export crop, brought in 23 percent. The sight of thousands of tons of sacked coffee and cocoa beans in a huge warehouse in Abidjan testified to their importance and left a vivid picture in my mind.

I had hardly known of the commercial pineapple industry in the Ivory Coast. A visit to the SALCI pineapple plantation and canning factory at Ono Lagoon was a fascinating experience. But the visit, including the warm hospitality of the manager, has, I fear, made pineapples seem more valuable than they really are. Actually, pineapples, fresh and canned, made up just a little over 1 percent of the Ivory Coast's exports in 1960.

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Soviet Farm Shortages

Concerned about the USSR's lagging agriculture, Khrushchev tells the Communist Party Central Committee that you can't demand high labor productivity and hack corn with an axe.

By LAZAR VOLIN
East European Analysis Branch
Economic Research Service

Soviet agriculture has been much in the spotlight recently because 1961 was the third successive disappointing year to the agricultural planners in the Kremlin. Though the country's 7-year plan for 1959 through 1965 calls for an 8-percent annual increase, output last year registered only a slight gain over that of the two comparatively low years that preceded it.

This unfavorable agricultural situation has been hammered home at numerous conferences, beginning with the Communist Party's Central Committee meeting in January 1961, continuing with a number of regional meetings, and culminating with the Committee session this past March.

Premier Khrushchev attended most of these meetings and made lengthy speeches. He consistently underemphasized the influence of unfavorable weather on production and placed the blame for lack of agricultural progress principally on faulty leadership and management, inadequate training and direction of the labor force, and incorrect utilization of land—meaning by this last, a crop pattern which does not maximize production. In particular, he had reference to feed crops which have been a bottleneck in livestock production.

Shortages Cited

This year, in his speech to the Central Committee, Khrushchev showed a greater recognition of farm shortages —machinery, fertilizers, herbicides, and such—than he has in the past. "It is impossible," he said, "to demand high productivity of labor and to hack the corn with an axe." And he cited figures indicating the extent to which the inventories of various agricultural machines fall short of requirements. These are still considerably below those of the United States, where the sown cropland totals about 330 million acres compared to the Soviet Union's 500 million.

With respect to commercial fertilizer, Khrushchev pointed out that while the 7-year plan specifies a 23-million ton increase in fertilizer output between 1958 and 1965, the increase in 1961 was only 2.9 million tons. The herbicides program was marked by a similar failure.

Despite these shortages, no new programs were announced for farm machinery, fertilizer, or herbicides. At the beginning of the conference, Khrushchev showed his awareness of the inadequate capital investment in agriculture and made vague promises of assistance. Later, though reaffirming his earlier stand, he stressed the need for much better utilization of existing equipment of collective and state farms.

On increased economic incentives to farmers, Khrushchev acknowledged that his "recommendation" in the late 1950's to raise welfare expenditures (the building of clubs, schools, hospitals, child nurseries, and such) on collective farms rather than to raise payments to individual workers had led to an encroachment on the amount of income available for distribution to farm workers. He condemned this practice. But no mention was made of the high cost of manufactured goods and their shortage, which constitute a serious obstacle to greater economic incentives to farmers. This is a situation that is likely to continue as long as government shows a preference for promoting the growth of heavy industry and nonagricultural capital investments.

Administration Reorganized

The remedial program adopted by the Soviet Government at this year's Party conference included first, a reorganization of the administrative agricultural apparatus. Here the recent trend toward decentralization and multiplicity of government agencies dealing with agriculture was reversed. Government control over farming, and particularly over the collective farms, has been tightened. The separate administrations for collective and state farms were consolidated, and likewise, those that supervise production and procurement of farm products.

The principal new agency is the territorial or district farm production administration which in general will include several raions (similar to counties) and will supervise from 30 to 60 collective and state farms—though in some districts the number may run as high as 100 or as few as 15.

Headed by a director, the territorial administration also has a party agent with a staff of assistants. It exercises its farm supervision through a staff of inspectors-organizers. Its council, consisting of party and state officials and farm managers, is required to meet every 3 months to review the basic questions of production and procurement of farm products.

On the provincial and republican level, there is a committee, headed by the First Secretary of the local party board and including all important party and state officials concerned with agriculture, and also an administrative agency. On the federal level a new high-ranking agricultural committee was formed, headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Thus effort has not been spared to give considerable status to the new administrative machinery. But while the system may result in better coordination of government activities pertaining to agriculture, it could contribute to stifling even more farm management initiative at the grassroots level—always a weak spot in the Soviet collective farm system.

Crop Patterns Changed

A second remedy for lagging production that was adopted at the meeting concerns the crop pattern. Specifically, it involves a drastic reduction of the area under forage legumes, such as clover, grasses, summer fallow and oats, and replanting it with more intensive feed crops—corn, peas, sugar beets, and beans, for example. In this

(Continued on page 18)

The Farmers of India

Several years ago the Indian Council of Agricultural Research set out to publish a series of books entitled *Farmers of India*. The first dealt with the States of Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, and Himachal Pradesh. The second, published last year, covers the southern States of Madras, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and Mysore, where the soils support a highly developed agriculture.

This second volume, like the first presents a vast panorama of India's rural life—its farmers, their crops, their villages, and their customs. No detail is left out; thus it becomes an invaluable reference work. At the same time this account of South India is alive and vital, and it flows along in narrative style. For this, the credit must go to its author, M.S. Randhawa, whose writing is clear and expressive.

Important to the book are the many fine illustrations by one of India's most gifted photographers, Hari Krishan Gorkha. Several of them are shown in these two pages, revealing his sensitivity to Indian rural life, the people, and the landscape.

Thrashing paddy, Madras. Rice is the principal crop of this southern State where agriculture is advanced and yields are often the highest in India.

Above, the farmers of Mysore love cattle like their own children. Below, two Mysore women clean rice for their family meal.

Above, tapping the date palm for toddy in Andhra Pradesh. Below, women fill water jugs at community well in a Mysore village.

Above, a prosperous village in Madurai district, Madras. In spite of growing industrialization, some 82 percent of India's population still lives in villages and earns a livelihood from the land.

Bullocks are everywhere in India. Above, farmers use them for line sowing, and below, to pull farm carts to market.

Above, crops of Madras Uganda cotton. Below, bananas find a ready sale in grocer's shop on road to Trichur, Kerala.

Thailand—A Major New Corn Exporter

To help its farmers earn more money Thailand turned to corn and in less than 10 years has become the world's fifth-ranking corn exporter.

By JOSEPH C. DODSON[1]
U.S. Agricultural Attaché
Tokyo, Japan

Ten years ago Thailand had virtually a one-crop agriculture and the crop was rice. Today rice is still important but a second major crop has been added: Corn. In 1961 the country exported over 600,000 metric tons of corn, putting Thailand among the world's top five corn exporters.

Before World War II, corn production in Thailand amounted to less than 10,000 metric tons a year. As late as 1950, outturn was only about 25,000 tons. Then began a year-by-year increase that has accelerated sharply in the last 5 years. Production reached 542,000 tons in 1960 and between 650,000 and 700,000 in 1961.

Nearly all of Thailand's corn is exported—mostly to Japan, Singapore, Malaya, and Hong Kong. The country's 10 million head of cattle and large numbers of poultry are fed the cheap and readily available byproducts of rice refining. Some corn is fed, mostly to chickens, but on the whole it is too expensive.

Corn exports jumped from a 1950-54 average of 26,000 metric tons to a 1960 figure of 515,000 tons. Shipments in 1961 were expected to pass the 600,000 mark, moving corn ahead of tin as Thailand's third most valuable export. Valued at over $26 million, it is topped only by rubber and rice.

Japan, with its rapidly expanding requirements for feedstuffs, has been Thailand's biggest corn customer. In 1958-60, it bought 80 percent of Thai exports. Singapore, Malaya, and Hong Kong took most of the remainder.

In 1961, total sales were higher than in 1960, and the export pattern shifted with sales to Japan declining slightly and those to the other three importers increasing. Unstable market conditions resulting from floods and transportation difficulties hurt trade with Japan. At the same time demand strengthened elsewhere.

Exports were further encouraged by the Exports Standards Act of 1961, establishing quality standards for corn exports. In addition, the Ministry of Economic Affairs last fall established minimum export prices, to be revised periodically. Prices have remained above the minimum levels so far. On the 1961 crop they are running about 10 percent above those on the 1960 crop, about $64 a ton, f.o.b. Bangkok.

Introducing the Crop

Thailand's first corn was grown on a small scale and consumed as a specialty food item. Not until the early 1950's was it seen as a means of diversifying the nation's agricultural production. At that time, new varieties were imported and tested in a search for suitable types.

Nearly all the corn now produced is yellow flint and, in smaller amounts, yellow dent. The Guatemala variety is used on more than 90 percent of the planted area and has proved highest in yield and best suited to the varied soil and climatic conditions. Though some imported hybrid varieties have been tested, open pollinated types of corn and synthetic selection are preferred so as to avoid supplying new hybrid seed to Thailand's many small farmers each year.

Corn can be grown in most of Thailand but the most important regions are in the central and northeastern areas. The crop is also well adapted for rainy season cultivation on most upland soils.

Thailand has a long wet season and two corn crops can be harvested yearly under normal rainfall conditions. The first is planted in April or May and the second in August or September. Dependence on the rainfall involves some risks, and the second crop is especially vulnerable if rainfall is short late in the season. There are also moisture content problems with the first crop, harvested in the middle of the wet season.

On irrigated land, corn can be produced throughout the year and as many as three crops harvested. So far, however, little if any irrigated land has been diverted from rice to corn and, although corn can be grown in the rice paddies, this has not been recommended because of the problems caused by heavy clay soils.

Much of the increase in production has come from newly cleared land. The farmers have moved into forest areas and burned the undergrowth. A common practice is simply to dig holes and plant corn without plowing. Yields on these new lands are high but production declines rapidly after 2 or 3 years unless fertilizer is applied—and it usually isn't.

Glimpse at the Future

On the whole, the Ministry of Agriculture is pleased with the contribution corn has made to its crop diversification program. It is fostering research on new varieties, cultural practices, drying, storage, and transport; the extension service is emphasizing corn production; and farmers' technically illegal incursion into forest lands is apparently being overlooked.

The big question now is how long Thai corn production can continue to surge ahead at the recent rapid rate. The increase in 1961, though substantial, appears not to have been as large as expected, and yields on some of the land have already begun to decline. Still, if additional land is put under cultivation and the use of fertilizer is adopted, production could top a million tons a year.

Under present conditions, nearly all this corn would be available for export—if Thailand could continue to find the markets for it. Efforts are underway to cut dependence on Japan as a market and to increase domestic demand.

[1] Mr. Dodson was U.S. Agricultural Attaché, Bangkok, Thailand, when this article was written.

Dwarf Trees Mean More Fruit In Less Time For French Farmers

By DUDLEY G. WILLIAMS
Assistant U.S. Agricultural Attaché
Paris, France

Photothèque Pechiney Progil-Lyon

A tremendous expansion of dwarf fruit tree plantings in recent years is revolutionizing the French fruit industry and may change the country from a net importer to a net exporter of apples and pears.

The French Government has set a production goal of 1.2 million metric tons of apples by 1966, almost double estimated current production. Although the general feeling among members of the fruit trade is that the estimate is too optimistic, they agree that there will be substantial increases in the years ahead, barring unforeseen production hazards. A very large portion of the increase will be from dwarf trees.

The expansion in pear production is expected to be somewhat smaller but it too will come largely from dwarf trees.

Use of dwarf apple and pear trees has been common in some regions of France for many years, both for commercial production and, to a lesser extent, as ornamentals. Soon after the turn of this century, Paradise, an absolute dwarf stock, was used to develop dwarf apple trees in France and that stock, or variations of it, is still used today. Dwarf pears are grown on quince root stocks.

Small orchards, widely characteristic in France in the past, have given way in importance to larger, more efficient operations ranging from 50 to 250 acres. An important factor in bringing about the changing tenure patterns in fruit production is the resettlement in Metropolitan France, particularly the south and southwest, of Europeans from former French areas of Africa.

Many of these people have considerable wealth and are looking for sound investments within France. A large number are investing in land. They buy small holdings and combine them to form larger and more economical ones. At the same time, heavy investments are made in production improvements, including irrigation facilities and equipment, in an effort to realize maximum cash returns.

Most of these immigrants have had experience in fruit production, or at least know something about it, and know much less about some of the other crops suited for production in France. A desire for quick returns on investments led to the preference for dwarf over large trees.

Some Other Advantages

Dwarf trees offer a number of advantages over normal trees in addition to yielding speedier returns. They mature more quickly, are easier to care for, and allow growers greater flexibility in meeting changing economic conditions.

Dwarf trees begin producing commercially in 3 years and reach full production (12 to 15 tons per acre) in 5 years. Most varieties of normal trees do not begin full production for 8 to 10 years, and yields per acre are about the same or slightly above those of dwarf trees, as the smaller number of trees is offset by the greater production per tree. Pear production ranges from about 20 tons an acre for some early dwarf varieties to 8 or 10 tons for most late varieties.

Quicker returns are particularly important in view of the heavy capital investment and risks involved in starting an orchard. Costs run about $1,500 an acre, with the trees themselves making up over half the amount. The remaining money goes for such items as labor, land preparation, and supporting wire. It costs about $200 an acre to plant normal trees but costs increase substantially when land rent and upkeep during unproductive years are included.

The productive life span of dwarf trees is considerably shorter than for normal trees. This makes dwarf orchards a shorter-run proposition and cuts risks by enabling growers to shift orchard land to other crops at a considerably smaller loss of investment.

Courtesy Lucien Rollin

Sprinkler irrigation, as above, is used to provide water and combat frost. Left, harvesting dwarf pears in the South of France.

Dwarf trees are attached to strands of wire running the length of the row. This serves as protection against wind as well as giving support—a particularly important consideration in southern France where coastal winds are a continuous hazard. In addition, the reduced height of dwarf trees makes them easier to protect with pines or other trees as windbreaks.

At one time, French farmers saw still another advantage in dwarf trees. The fruit could be handily wrapped while still on the tree to give a very high-quality fruit that sold at a premium. Although this practice continues, mostly for pears, it is limited to small operations with abundant supplies of family labor because the price premium received is insufficient to justify the extra work required in a larger operation.

Cultural Practices

Approximately 1,600 dwarf trees are planted per acre, at intervals of 3 feet in rows roughly 9 feet apart. The number of semidwarf trees planted per acre is smaller and varies with the strength of the grafting stock. An acre holds around 35 standard trees.

The main trunks or stems of dwarf trees are carefully trained and the branches meticulously pruned. Generally, the main stems grow at a slant of about 45 degrees or else the trees are upright with two main branches in a U-shape. The trees are pruned severely during the fall and winter and retied to the supporting wires. Strands of osea, a rattan-type vine, are used for tying.

Sprinkler irrigation is used in many orchards, particularly larger ones. In a few instances irrigation is also used to combat spring frost damage. Some producers are able to take advantage of rivers or streams for irrigation water, while others have individual wells. Water has also been made available for some 6,000 acres near Nîmes, in southern France, under a government-sponsored irrigation and reclamation project. The project goal is for the irrigation of over half a million acres within 25 years.

Varieties and Growing Regions

American Golden Delicious is by far the most prominent variety planted in France and is expected to make up more than 90 percent of increased production in the next few years. Adaptation of this variety to dwarf stocks has succeeded with no loss to the fruit of its normal characteristics. Other varieties, both American and French, are either just holding their own or falling in popularity.

Nurseries have been grafting increasing quantities of Golden Delicious in recent years in an effort to keep up with increasing demand. Last year, over 90 percent of nursery graftings were Golden Delicious and the remainder was difficult to market.

Most of these apples are grown in the south and southwest: Between the Rhône and Garonne Rivers and in the Eastern Loire Valley, near Angers. Pears are also grown in the Rhône Valley as well as in the areas surrounding Paris. These are primarily Williams (Bartlett), Dr. Guyot, Comice, Hardy, Duke of Bordeaux, and Passes Crassane.

Marketing Problems Likely

The heavy concentration of Golden Delicious is causing some concern about future marketing possibilities. Movement toward a single variety means that huge quantities of apples would reach the market within a relatively short period of time and could disrupt it.

Although efforts are now directed toward improved storage and marketing facilities, many feel that production increases in the near future will considerably outstrip improvements in market and storage facilities and that export outlets will be needed for the overflow. In such a case France could produce more than enough apples at some times and still have to import some to meet off-season domestic requirements.

Indonesia's Sugar Industry

After a 30-year decline, Indonesia is working to regain some of its former importance as one of the world's leading producers and exporters of centrifugal sugar.

By CARL O. WINBERG
U.S. Agricultural Attaché, Indonesia

Thirty years ago Indonesia was the world's second largest producer and exporter of centrifugal sugar. Today, Indonesia does not produce enough to meet domestic demand.

World War II, depression, revolution, deterioration of materiel, and lack of producer incentive have taken their toll. Production of 2.7 million tons in the late 1920's became an estimated 650,000 tons in 1961-62. Exports of 2.5 million tons became the current inability to supply even a part of the basic export tonnage of 350,000 tons allotted by the International Sugar Agreement.

In the 1930's, world sugar-exporting countries feared the potential capacity of Indonesia (then the Netherlands East Indies) to produce sugar and competition from any increased exports of its low-cost sugar. The country had seemingly endless areas suitable for growing sugarcane. Areas of level land, deep soils, and abundant water stretched for hundreds of miles along the north coast.

Then came the depression and Indonesia's sugar production never fully recovered. Production by the end of the 1930's averaged only 1.5 million tons and exports, 1.2 million. Later, the sugar industry suffered heavily from World War II and occupation damage.

Before the sugar industry could revive, Indonesia split from the Netherlands, and the forced exodus of the Dutch removed most of the industry's experienced managerial and technical personnel. Nationalization of most of the sugar mills followed.

Prior to the War, Indonesia had 86 sugar mills in operation; there are now 55. Many of these mills have been in operation for 50 to 60 years and need repairs and new equipment. Due to changing cultural patterns, some of the mills are now too far from sufficient sugarcane, and transportation costs are uneconomic.

The dwindling supply of sugarcane for the mills is a key problem. Many farmers now prefer to raise crops with shorter growing seasons and better returns. During the 18 months the land is producing one crop of sugarcane, the farmer can grow at least three crops of tobacco, green beans, soybeans, or other crops.

Most sugarcane is produced by small farmers who work their own land, or lease the land to the sugar mills which then employ them to work it. Low rental payments cause the farmers to retain their better land for more remunerative crops and lease only the poorer land to the mills. Valuable sugarcane land has been lost to squatters and, with the population growing steadily, land is being preempted for houses and gardens.

Small farmers also find it more profitable to sell their cane to the producers of crude brown sugar, *gula mangkok*, than to the mills. These small, individual producers of "backyard" crude sugar can afford to pay more and give immediate cash payment, while government mills pay fixed prices and payment is often late.

Incentive Low

Lack of incentive has lowered output throughout the production pattern. Though Indonesia has a large labor force, the sugarcane field laborers, and particularly the seasonal laborers, receive low wages and this, coupled with inexperience, leads to less efficient harvesting of cane.

Since the Dutch left, there has been a shortage of skilled personnel to manage and operate the mills, to grow the cane and conduct sugar research. Under nationalization, estate managers are now government employees and not entitled to the bonuses which had been as high as 60 percent of the annual salary. Elimination of bonuses has no doubt lowered incentive.

Transport facilities, such as trucks and bullock carts, are in acute shortage and this hampers movement of sugarcane and supplies, including fertilizers. Slow transportation dries the cane and lessens the sugar content. Much of the equipment is old and inadequate. Replacements and parts are not readily available because of the growing demand for all such equipment. Reduced yields have also resulted from inadequate maintenance of irrigation systems, poor-quality seed cane, limited or improper use of fertilizers, and inability to control diseases and insects, due to lack of know-how and supplies.

Consumption Is High

Because of this complex of problems, production is at an alltime low. Yet domestic consumption has more than tripled since 1938—though still less than 18 pounds per capita a year—and population is growing at an annual rate of 2.3 percent. The government estimates consumption should be 1 million tons a year beginning in 1962. (This includes sugar rations to such large groups as the military and government employees.) This consumption seemingly must be met by increased production, since Indonesia's current shortage of foreign exchange precludes imports.

Indonesia has already taken a number of remedial actions. Among them are an increase in land rent for sugarcane, higher official prices for refined sugar, compulsory delivery of cane to sugar mills (which may step up deliveries to the mills during this crushing season, but may well deter next year's planting), increases in the sugar laborers' income and a subsidized ration system, a bonus system for increased production and output, and improved irrigation.

Indonesia's Eight-Year Plan, which is to be completed in 1969, proposes construction of approximately 63 additional sugar mills with an annual capacity of 50,000 metric tons per mill. Many are to be located nearer cane-producing areas. Rehabilitation of old mills is supposed to bring the total number of mills actually in operation to at least 115, and would cost about $111 million.

The plan sets a goal of per capita

consumption per year of about 28 pounds, or an annual consumption of about 1.4 million tons by 1969. Annual exports are expected to reach 550,000 tons.

At the present time, however, sugarcane and sugar production continue to decline. Measures taken so far have failed to reverse the downward trend. Each new decree limiting movement of cane or stating ceiling prices for sugarcane seems to reduce the incentive to grow sugarcane, or to sell it to government mills.

The government cannot afford adequate cash incentives. Even more important, it cannot afford the inflationary spiral resulting from increased production costs and higher prices.

Indonesia's past achievements in the production and export of sugar offer ample proof that attainment of the ambitious objectives included in the Eight-Year Plan is well within the country's capacity. However, unless there is a pronounced change in the government's sugar policy, it is likely that there will be no significant increases in sugar production and certainly no large-scale exports.

Soviet Farm Shortages

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way, it is hoped to boost significantly the production of animal feeds.

However, in the humid regions of the USSR where such a change is feasible, shortages of fertilizer, herbicides, and machinery still present an unresolved obstacle to the shift from summer fallow and tame hay to the more intensive feed crops. In the dry regions, a drastic reduction of summer fallow is likely to bring about a deterioration of crop yields. Already, continuous cropping in the eastern "new lands" regions has caused a serious weed problem. Thus, this crop-pattern shift from which additional feed production is expected may be full of pitfalls.

Firsthand vs. Secondhand

(Continued from page 10)

Likewise, the warm receptions we received at the cotton textile mill and at the cotton research station, both at Bouaké in "up state" Ivory Coast, probably warped our judgment with regard to cotton. The mill uses 10,000 bales a year, of which 6,250 bales—less than 1 percent of Alabama's yearly output—represents the Ivory Coast crop. The remainder is imported from Mali and Upper Volta.

At Bouaké, we were also shown some experimental work on livestock. Small herds of indigenous cattle, N'Damas and Baoulés, were getting neither grain nor concentrates, and they produced practically no milk. The technicians were proud that the cattle had an annual growth rate of 25 percent—that is, they were full grown at 4 years!

Liberia—Senegal

In Liberia, my personal observations were bound to coincide with the economic facts. The 50-mile drive from the airport to the capital, Monrovia, goes right through the middle of the Firestone rubber plantations. Rubber is Liberia's major—and almost only—agricultural export. Iron ore has also become an important Liberian export.

My off-season peanut experience was repeated in Senegal. However, I felt that my stop there was worthwhile for the look it gave me at agriculture in a semiarid part of Africa and for the comparisons I was able to make between research methods of the English-speaking station at Samaru in Northern Nigeria and the French-speaking one that I visited at Bambey in Senegal.

"Look See" Not Enough

Reviewing this trip back in Washington, I asked myself what I had gained. Now that I had seen these African countries, would I be in a better position to write about them?

Yes—definitely. Personal observations give vivid insights into many subjects only partially understood before. But alone they are not sufficient. Unless a person can spend many months in a country studying some particular phase of its economic or social pattern, he must rely heavily on secondary sources. They enable one to write about a country in a detached, balanced, and objective manner—and that cannot be done if all that is known about a place is what was seen on a single short visit.

Agricultural Prospects In the Common Market

In a recent speech before the German Agricultural Society, Dr. A. Hanau, Director of the Institute for Agricultural Marketing at the University of Goettingen, estimated that if the European Economic Community's common grain prices are raised to the German level, total grain production might well increase by 2.5 percent per year during the decade ending in 1970. Dr. Hanau thinks, however, that EEC grain prices will, in the end, be set somewhere between the high level of Germany and Italy and the low level of France and the Netherlands.

Yet, even if present prices and price relationships continue, agricultural production in the Common Market can be expected to outstrip consumption. Moreover, general economic growth may well slow down, perhaps to the still formidable rate of 3.5 percent per person per year, from the 4 percent of 1955-60. Such a reduction would have a marked influence on the development of consumption.

Already, Dr. Hanau points out, the EEC's domestic supply of soft wheat exceeds requirements, and complete self-sufficiency has been achieved for sugar, milk, and dairy products. For beef, that point is not very likely to be reached; Western Europe's preference for lean meat is becoming more and more pronounced, yet its beef production can be increased only gradually and to a limited extent. There will be some substitution of pork.

For slaughter hogs, eggs, and poultry, Dr. Hanau believes that prospects will be governed by grain supplies and prices, but self-sufficiency is likely to increase. There is still need for feed-grain imports, but over the long term it will decrease as some bread grain acreage is diverted to feed grains and more bread grains are fed. A considerable gap remains, however, for vegetable oils and fats.

Dr. Hanau feels that the Common Market is unlikely to develop an extreme price-support policy that would rule out supplies from third countries. Such a policy would, no doubt, have disadvantageous political and trade consequences which he thinks the EEC nations would wish to avoid.



The Village of Rösum before (left) and after consolidation. Each shaded area represents a parcel of land. Some farmers still have two or more plots, split between the forested outer region and the central pasture and arable land area.

Land in a Swedish Village

By SHACKFORD PITCHER
Foreign Agricultural Service

Sweden's countryside is dotted with thousands of villages, some containing two or three farms and others with more than 50. Most are in the process of consolidating land that became badly fragmented as it passed from generation to generation.

In the past 10 or 15 years, the number of Swedish farms has dwindled but the amount of land under cultivation has remained fairly stable at 3.5 million hectares (a hectare equals 2.47 acres.) Some 25,000 farms have been discontinued, most of them 10 hectares or less in size, while the total number of farms of 20 hectares or more has gone up.

There are many reasons for this. Sweden's farm labor force has decreased rapidly as young men leave the farms for jobs in industry. Between 1950 and 1961 the number of permanent farm workers decreased 32 percent and the number of seasonal workers, 61 percent. At the same time, farm labor cost rose.

There also has been a great increase in mechanization and in the adoption of other labor-saving devices, all requiring large farms for maximum efficiency. In addition to these more or less typical conditions is Sweden's unique position of having land readily available for sale on the open market.

Rösum, a small village in the southern highlands, is characteristic of the many Swedish villages that have undergone a thorough change in the last 10 years. It has 48 hectares of arable land, 18 hectares of pasture, and 250 hectares of productive forest land. Before consolidation, the village's eight farms each had an average of 7 hectares of arable land and 25 to 30 hectares of forest. Only one of the eight had enough arable land to be considered an economical family farm unit, and in most cases, farms were broken up into many separate plots.

At the time of the "Great Land Consolidation" about 100 years ago, there were only two farms in the village. Since then most subdivision has taken place by *sämjedelning*: unofficial land division, usually made informally and without transfer of title. By the time this fragmentation was over, half of Rösum's farms had 15 or more separate land parcels, many not adjacent to one another. Division of forest land was incomplete and four of the farmers owned parcels jointly.

In the fall of 1951 the Jönköping County Agricultural Board stepped into the Rösum picture by accepting an offer to buy the largest farm in the village. In each Swedish county there is an agricultural board to assist with projects by authorizing financial aid and helping with planning.

After buying the farm, the board notified the villagers that it would be up for sale as soon as a satisfactory land-use plan for the entire village was drawn up. During the following year, preliminary plans were made to improve roads and drainage, alter the configuration of fields, and redivide the land. The board authorized government loans for many projects and, in July bought another farm.

Today there are six viable family farms in Rösum, 15 plots of land in all. All the open fields have been cleared of rocks and properly drained; good pasture has replaced the poorer arable fields; tractors have replaced horses and oxen. One young man is about to take over his father's farm—instead of moving to an industrial area as he might have if the farm had not been improved.

There are still divided farms left in Rösum but most of them are now broken into only two plots: one toward the center of the village where the pasture, cropland, and farmsteads are concentrated, and the other in the outer forest area. Here, as in most of Sweden, farmers generally own forest land. (Over 50 percent of Sweden's forest land is owned by private individuals, the vast majority of whom are farmers.) To a large extent, farming and forestry are complementary, with much of the forest work done in the winter when farm activities require little time.

Some of Sweden's land consolidation projects have succeeded without the help of the county agricultural boards but Rösum's, like the majority, owes its success largely to the use of land previously owned by the board.

THE FOREIGN MARKET For U.S. Rice

By DEXTER V. RIVENBURGH
Grain and Feed Division
Foreign Agricultural Service

The U.S. rice situation today is vastly different from that of 5 years ago. Consequently, in evaluating the markets for our rice abroad in 1962-63, it is important that the immediate future be viewed in the perspective of what happened in these 5 years.

In 1957, carryover stocks at the opening of the rice marketing year were over 1.6 million metric tons (rough rice equivalent), largely in government inventories. Today, stocks are well below half a million tons and likely to go still lower by the beginning of 1962-63. Government inventories are almost nonexistent.

During the last 5 years, acreages have remained constant but there have been higher per acre yields. Both this added production and the carryover stocks have been exported, despite the loss of the large Cuban market.

In 1957, total exports amounted to only 210,000 metric tons. Now the United States exports rice at the rate of about 1.4 million tons a year.

New markets have been opening up. For example, 5 years ago Africa took only 18,000 tons; last year that continent bought 160,000 tons of U.S. rice. In Europe, sales moved from 32,000 tons to 200,000 tons.

A large portion of these increases was in the form of dollar sales. Excluding Cuba, our cash sales for dollars totaled about 54,000 tons in 1957. Last year—with no sales to Cuba—they were about 490,000 tons.

Now, more than halfway through the 1961-62 marketing year, cash sales exhibit many of the same characteristics. There are several related factors that caused marked improvements.

World supplies of rice for export, particularly those from Nationalist China, have been declining for some months. This has resulted in a rather firm and steady market with rising prices, particularly for top grades.

U.S. rice has remained competitive in the world market because a payment-in-kind program has boosted commercial sales to present levels.

The third factor boosting sales is market development work, including widespread participation in exhibitions and fairs. Attention is focused on the desirable aspects of increased rice consumption and on the qualities and high standards of U.S. rice. Increased promotion by our rice firms complements these efforts.

There will probably be further expansion of U.S. exports in 1962-63. World export supplies until February 1963 are not likely to be quite as large as those of the previous year. Supplies will be short in Vietnam and Egypt until the end of 1962, and in Mainland China they will continue to be limited beyond then. Thus, a substantial tonnage will have to come from other sources.

Weather permitting, there will be no worldwide shortage of rice in 1962-63, but the major exporters have no buffer stocks on hand, and the balance of 1961-62 and all of the 1962-63 demand will have to be met from current production.

In the immediate future there are two other uncertainties on the horizon, either of which could prove dangerous. If world rice prices were to move up rapidly because of poor 1962 crops, the trade volume would decline because rice is a sensitive, high-priced commodity.

Among the large importers—who, as a group, have the problem of financing imports—cutbacks in rice imports and shifts to other commodities could come rapidly. This is what happened in 1955-56 when rice was in world surplus and the United States had large holdings. The stagnation of trade and the abrupt fall in world prices did not come from overproduction but from consumer resistance to high prices.

The other big question is raised by the European Common Market. Europe has a highly developed milling industry but rice is grown only in France and Italy among the six members.

Currently, the Common Market is the principal commercial outlet for our long-grain rice and the only one of any importance for short-grain varieties. If the final agreements within the Community result in sharply limiting rice imports and encouraging increased production within the area, there would be a danger of losing an appreciable part of the present sales of long-grain rice in West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium and of short-grain rice in West Germany.

It is quite likely that U.S. rice sales can be maintained and extended in 1962-63 if the Common Market's policies do not adversely affect this country's competitive position. The areas currently offering the best opportunities for rice promotion are the United Kingdom, the Common Market area, Scandinavia, the Middle East, south and west Africa, and the rice-deficit countries of Latin America.

U.S. Agricultural Exports Pass $5 Billion in 1961

In calendar year 1961, for the first time, the nation's agricultural exports topped the $5 billion mark. Value totaled $5,030 million, 4 percent more than the $4,832 million in 1960. In volume, agricultural exports were about equal to the record of 1960.

The export rise last year was dominated by the unprecedented movement of wheat and flour, which increased by $270 million over the previous year. Other increases were in poultry meat, variety meats, dairy products, hides and skins, rye, tobacco, and fruits and preparations.

The principal decline in 1961 was in cotton, which fell by $105 million. Exports of rice, soybeans, cottonseed and soybean oils, lard, and vegetables were also smaller. However, higher soybean prices more than compensated for the quantity drop.

This export record set in 1961 was equivalent to 14 percent of the total cash receipts from U.S. farm marketings. Exports provided an outlet for about half of the wheat, rice, and dried peas produced; two-fifths of the cotton and tallow; and nearly a third of the tobacco, soybeans, hops, nonfat dry milk, and hides and skins.

Sales for dollars accounted for 69 percent of U.S. agricultural exports in 1961; they totaled $3,468 million, compared with $3,355 million in the previous year. Dollar sales included, in addition to unassisted commercial transactions, shipments of some commodities with government assistance in the form of (1) credits for relatively short periods, (2) sales of government-owned commodities at less than domestic prices, and (3) export payments in cash or in kind.

The principal increase in dollar sales occurred in wheat, which gained over $150 million. Other dollar gainers included tobacco, soybeans, fruits, and animal products. Major decline—$70 million—was in cotton.

The other 31 percent of the exports moved under government programs—Public Law 480 and the Mutual Security Act. Shipments under these programs totaled $1,561 million compared with $1,471 million in 1960.

Cotton exports excluding linters declined to 6.4 million running bales in 1961 from 7.5 million in 1960, when exports were the largest in over a quarter century. In the last half of calendar 1961, most foreign textile manufacturing countries imported less cotton than they consumed, and thus reduced their stocks. A year earlier they were increasing stocks. Indications are that foreign Free World consumption was somewhat less in 1961 than in 1960.

In addition, record cotton production in the foreign Free World in the 1960-61 season—amounting to 19.1 million bales—reduced foreign demand for U.S. cotton. (And the 1961-62 foreign Free World crop is expected to be almost as large as the previous season's.) The leading foreign markets for U.S. cotton in 1961 were Japan, France, Italy, West Germany, and the United Kingdom, which together took over half of U.S. shipments. Exports under government programs such as P.L. 480 and the Mutual Security Act totaled 1.4 million bales in 1961 compared with 1.8 million in 1960.

Wheat and flour exports advanced to a record 730 million bushels, 130 million above the 1960 level. Large P.L. 480 foreign-currency sales were made to India, Brazil, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Yugoslavia. India continued to be the largest single recipient, although its takings fell to 88 million bushels from 161 million in the previous year.

Smaller European wheat production in the past season led to a substantial increase in U.S. exports to the dollar-paying countries of Western Europe; exports rose to 119 million bushels in 1961 from 53 million in 1960. The largest gain occurred in exports to Italy, which took 50 million bushels compared with 9 million in the previous year. Other dollar gains came from sales to such European countries as West Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, France, and Belgium.

Milled rice exports fell to 18.3 million bags from 21.7 million in the previous year. Shipments under Title I of P.L. 480 dropped to 7.6 million bags from 11.2 million the year before, reflecting mostly reductions for India and Pakistan.

The principal reason for last year's



Prepared in the Trade Statistics and Analysis Branch, Development and Trade Analysis Division, Economic Research Service.

decline was a further decrease in availabilities; carryover stocks had fallen to 6.5 million bags on August 1, 1961, from the record of 34.6 million on August 1, 1956. The main foreign markets last year were India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and West Germany. They accounted for half the volume of U.S. exports. Because of trade restrictions, there were no rice shipments to Cuba, once the leading market.

Exports of *feed grains*, excluding products, amounted to 10.7 million metric tons, only slightly larger than the 10.5 million in 1960. Corn exports set a record, but exports of other feed grains were lower. About 73 percent of the feed-grain exports were commercial sales for dollars.

Shipments to the European market declined by over 1 million tons, but this reduction was more than offset by larger shipments to Japan, Canada, and other areas. Despite the drop in exports to Europe, that area remained the best foreign market, accounting for two-thirds of total U.S. feed-grain exports. In recent years, Western Europe has been importing about 15 million tons annually, and the United States has supplied about 40 percent.

Tobacco exports totaled 501 million pounds (export weight), only slightly larger than the 496 million of a year earlier. The principal foreign markets for U.S. tobacco were the United Kingdom, West Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Sweden, Belgium, and Switzerland. About 80 percent of the total exports were commercial sales for dollars. U.S. tobacco exports continued to benefit from increased foreign use and from the large U.S. production of high-quality leaf. In addition, blue-mold damage in several important European producing countries necessitated larger imports from the United States. Consumption of tobacco products in the foreign Free World has been gaining about 5 percent annually in recent years; but in the past 3 years, foreign producers have accounted for most of the increase in world exports.

Soybean exports of 133 million bushels were 15 million below the record level of the previous year. Exports during most of 1961 were limited by higher prices reflecting the relatively short supplies and the anticipation of lower prices in 1962 from the record 1961 crop.

Foreign developments in fats and oils that contributed last year to the relatively high level of U.S. soybean exports have been the comparatively small volume of beans entering international trade from Communist China, the continued strong demand for oilseeds and products in Western Europe and Japan, and the smaller volume of Philippine copra and coconut oil moving in world trade.

Exports of *edible vegetable oils* (cottonseed and soybean) totaled 960 million pounds, about 35 percent below the 1,510 million exported in the previous year. The decline resulted principally from higher prices, smaller exports under government programs, and increased production in Europe. In addition, Japan and many of the countries in Europe prefer to import oilseeds, in order to obtain their by-product, protein meal, for use in livestock feed.

U.S. exports of *fruits and preparations* totaled $271 million compared with $249 million a year earlier. There was a substantial increase in exports of canned fruits, with smaller gains in fruit juices, raisins, fresh apples, fresh pears, and fresh grapefruit. Higher prices resulted in a value increase for oranges though volume fell slightly. About two-thirds of the orange exports were shipped to Canada. Exports of fruits generally were stimulated in the past year by the small deciduous crop in Europe and the further relaxation of trade restrictions there.

Exports of *vegetables and preparations* declined to $123 million from $140 million in 1960. The largest decline occurred in dried beans, with smaller decreases in potatoes, canned vegetables, and dried peas. Exports of fresh vegetables gained slightly. There were sharp declines last year in U.S. bean exports to both Europe and Latin America. Europe imported fewer U.S. beans because it had larger stocks of canned beans and because exportable U.S. supplies of Great Northern beans —a European favorite—were limited. Larger bean production in Brazil and Mexico contributed most to the smaller U.S. shipments to Latin America.

Exports of *animals and animal products* increased to $642 million from $576 million in the previous year. Except for lard, there were gains in sales of all major animal products, including tallow, poultry meat, variety meats, hides and skins, and dairy products. Booming economic activity in Japan and Western Europe has greatly stimulated demand.

Lard exports of 419 million pounds were 201 million below the high level of 1960. Considerably higher prices in the first half of 1961 made U.S. lard less competitive in the world market. The loss of the Cuban market also contributed to the drop in lard.

Exports of tallow (edible and inedible), totaling 1,596 million pounds, were 70 million above the previous year. Japan continued to be the best single customer, taking about 400 million pounds. Exports last year were strengthened by Russian purchases of 198 million pounds. Exports to the Common Market declined by 100 million pounds.

Exports of variety meats, continuing to advance to new highs, totaled 123 million pounds, up 4 percent from the 118 million in 1960. Relatively low-priced variety meats have become popular in Western Europe to supplement meat output there. About three-fourths of U.S. variety meat exports moved to the West European market.

Poultry meat exports of 248 million pounds topped the previous year's record by 71 million pounds. The substantial gain in exports reflected lower prices and extensive market development programs in the major outlet, Western Europe.

Exports of dairy products totaled $138 million compared with $117 million in 1960. There was a substantial increase in nonfat dry milk under government-financed programs. Shipments of dried whole and evaporated milk fell by 35 and 10 percent, respectively, while those of other dairy products remained at about the levels of the previous year.

Exports of hides and skins totaled 12.6 million pieces in 1961 compared with 11.4 million in the previous year. Increased U.S. supplies at competitive prices have encouraged exports. Cattle hides accounted for about four-fifths.

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

Australia Rates the U.S. As Its No. 1 Meat Outlet

By taking 49 percent of Australia's meat exports in 1961, the United States has now replaced the United Kingdom as that country's major foreign market for meat.

Australian shipments to the United States last year amounted to 309 million pounds and consisted mainly of beef and veal. The United Kingdom's takings totaled 194 million pounds, also largely beef and veal.

There were two reasons for this shift. In 1961, beef prices fell off in the United Kingdom while those in the United States remained firm. Also, in October an Australian-U.K. meat agreement removed the restrictions which limited the quantities of first- and second-quality beef that might be shipped to the United States.

Europeans Eating More Butter as Sales Mount

Prosperity in Europe, in terms of more butter on one's bread, has caused both French and Danish butter shipments to increase.

French exports in the first 11 months of 1961 totaled 100 million pounds, or more than twice those of the same period in 1960. Denmark's exports increased 3 percent over 1960 to reach 265 million pounds.

France shipped 33 million pounds to the United Kingdom compared with only 8 million in the earlier year. West Germany and Italy were also leading markets.

Denmark, however, saw butter sales to the United Kingdom, its leading market, drop 14 million pounds to 210 million pounds. Danish sales to other traditional markets—West Germany, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden—were up. In addition, Denmark increased its butter shipments to the Soviet Union from 2,000 pounds in 1960 to 10 million pounds.

California and Texas Lead as Farm Exporters

Although agricultural exports are important to the farm economy of all States, the two that earn the most from their shipments abroad are California and Texas.

In the fiscal year 1961, California's agricultural exports brought in $447 million and those of Texas $446 million. Next in line were Illinois with $320 million, Iowa $248 million, and North Carolina $210 million.

(These figures are estimated on the basis of national export figures and each State's share of the total amount of commodities that is shipped.)

New Record Established For U.S. Variety Meats

U.S. variety meat exports last year reached a new high level—124 million pounds.

In terms of weight, West Germany was the largest market, taking 33 million pounds, about 4 million less than in 1960. The Netherlands was second and the United Kingdom third. Although France had a beef surplus last year, its purchases increased by about 5 million pounds because of the relatively low U.S. prices.

U.S. Burley Shipments Climb To Over $30 Million Worth

Last year foreign sales of U.S. burley tobacco set a value record of $30.1 million and also reached the highest volume level since 1950.

The amount shipped totaled 39.6 million pounds, export weight. West Germany was the largest market, followed by Italy, Sweden, Portugal, and Mexico. Sales to West Germany, however, were below those of the previous year.

The six Common Market countries took 16.3 million pounds in 1961 compared to 15 million in 1960.

British Commons Turns Down Higher Duties on Dry Peas

Recently the British Board of Trade informed the House of Commons that the request of the National Farmers' Union for higher tariffs on dry peas was not justified.

For U.S. pea producers this is good news. The United Kingdom has been buying nearly 800,000 bags annually for the last 3 years and is now the leading foreign market for U.S. Alaska peas, which are especially suited for canning, and therefore in demand.

$37-Million Increase Seen For Japan-Red China Trade

Trade between Japan and Red China is expected to reach $80 million in 1962, according to a recent Japanese Foreign Ministry announcement.

This is a $37-million increase over 1961 and would indicate that trade between the two countries is moving toward the $141-million level of 1957, the year before the trampling of a Chinese Communist flag by a Japanese caused China to shut off trade almost entirely. The step reportedly reflected Red China Government efforts to force Japan to set up intergovernmental trade relations instead of unofficial business dealings between the Chinese Government and Japanese trade groups.

Japanese firms will send Red China steel products, textile raw materials, and chemical fertilizer in return for salt, coking coal, and soybeans. These are more or less the same commodities traded before, under the same auspices.

Poor Crop Forces Brazil To Purchase Extra Wheat

Brazil, always a wheat importer, will be buying more wheat this season as a result of its poor harvest in 1961.

The country's wheat imports last year totaled 1.9 million tons, of which the United States supplied 1.6 million, mostly under Public Law 480. Traditionally, Argentina is Brazil's wheat source but its exportable supplies were low last year. Prospects for this year are improved.

Brazil will also continue to take around 200,000 tons from the Soviet Union, as it has for the past 2 years.

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Finland Asks Soviet Union For More Rye, Less Wheat

Now that Poland has turned down the 140,000 tons of wheat that Finland has counted on transshipping to that country, Finland wants to buy 40,000 tons fewer of Soviet wheat and that much more rye. The Polish refusal gave as the reason the high price of Soviet wheat.

Under the present 1961-65 agreement and the preceding 5-year pact, Finland contracted for at least 200,000 tons of wheat a year and 80,000 tons of rye, plus some corn. The 1962 pact sets the figure at 27,000 tons of bread grains, 1,000 tons higher than in the previous year.

Argentina Cuts Export Taxes To Encourage Sales Abroad

Recent steps eliminating more export taxes and exchange retentions on farm products, and similar moves also planned for this year, should complete Argentina's shift from multiple exchange rates to an exchange system based on a single rate.

Retentions amounting to 10 or 20 percent of official export value were set up in 1959 as a part of Argentina's economic stabilization program, but began to be removed or reduced on a number of products in 1960 to stimulate the country's farm production and increase its exports.

Earlier this year a decree eliminated a 10-percent export sales tax on live animals and raw hides and skins and a 4-percent tax on meat, variety meats, and other byproducts. A later decree removed the 10-percent exchange retention and an 8-percent sales tax on corn, millet, sorghum grain, kaffir, and guinea corn.

Wool, wheat, barley, oats, rye, and flaxseed and linseed oil still carry a 10-percent retention, hides and skins a 20-percent retention.

U.S. Beef and Cattle Imports Showed Sharp Rise Last Year

Foreign shipments of red meat and cattle into the United States in 1961 continued at a high level.

Red meat imports were 25 percent larger than in the previous year, with beef and veal registering the sharpest rise. Cattle imports climbed 57 percent, because of the strong demand for feeder cattle at relatively good prices in the United States.

Other livestock products that gained were variety meats 12 percent; natural casings 12 percent; cattle and buffalo hides 12 percent; kip skins 31 percent; and wool 9 percent.

Danes To Push Poultry Sales to West Germany

Faced with increased competition from the United States and the Netherlands, the Danes are stepping up their poultry promotion program in West Germany. They plan to spend four to six times as much in 1962 as they did in 1961 and still more in subsequent years.

West Germany's total imports of dressed poultry were 134,500 metric tons in the first 10 months of 1961, 36 percent more than in 1960 and twice the 1958 total. All three major suppliers have increased their sales in recent years, the United States most spectacularly—from 3,200 tons in all of 1958 to 45,600 tons in the first 10 months of 1961 alone. Denmark's market position has declined; it had the lowest growth rate of the three.

British To Get U.S. Hotdogs But Must Buy Them in Cans

The British will be able to eat U.S. hotdogs as a result of new import liberalizations which also include various types of sausage as well as smoked ham with lima beans. But because Britain bans fresh, chilled, and frozen meat products from the U.S. all of these must be bought in cans.